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In Search of Women Photographers in Twentieth-Century India

March 7, 2025
By 31414

Exploring the largely hidden history of early women photographers in India, Sreerupa Bhattacharya (Jadavpur University, 2018) follows traces of their work to uncover the contributions they made in shaping the art and practice of photography on the subcontinent.

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In an 1898 issue of Amrita Bazar Patrika, one of the leading daily newspapers in colonial Bengal, appeared an advertisement for a well-known photo studio, emphasizing the availability of “female artists” to photograph women. A lady behind the lens meant that elite women could have their photographs taken without inviting anxieties about being seen unveiled by men in public. It is, however, not known if these “artists” were necessarily only photographers or also those involved in tinting and retouching photographs.

Notwithstanding, it is significant that photography emerged as a source of employment for European as well as native women at the turn of the twentieth century. When the first all-women’s studio in India was established in 1892 to exclusively serve a female clientele, it recruited “native female assistants” who were led by an Englishwoman. These examples attest to women’s prolific presence in a range of photographic works at a time when they were yet to become key players in the many other technology-led industries in colonial India.

My doctoral research examines women’s photographic practices in early- to mid-twentieth-century India and their rediscovery in contemporary times, with a focus on questions of labor, materiality, and representation. Recent curatorial and scholarly interests in twentieth-century Indian women behind the lens have largely focused on family and domestic photography. My project seeks to build on this scholarship by moving away from the biographical approach and mapping individual practices onto the larger discourse of photography. The purpose is not only to recover little-known lives and their contributions but also to expose marginalized objects, sites, and networks through them in order to potentially reconfigure the photo history in the subcontinent and expand our understanding of photography in turn.

Footnotes in Photo History

Women, until recently, have been footnotes in the grand narrative of the history of photography in India that has mainly dramatized the conflict between the colonizer and the colonized, emphasized the peculiarly Indian character of photography, and celebrated its pioneering male figures. The “native female assistant” remained nameless, for instance, in the several monographs on the work of Lala Deen Dayal, the eminent photographer who established the photo studio in which these women worked.

In his 2008 book The Coming of Photography in India delineating the sociocultural, political, and philosophical implications of the arrival of the camera under the Raj, art historian Christopher Pinney mentions a set of calotypes and photograms by an unknown female photographer. Made in the 1840s, they are significant as the earliest extant photographs of India. Yet, she receives no more than a passing reference. Perhaps no more than that is possible since institutional archives bear only traces of such women’s presence.

Rather than bemoan such absences, my project explores them as speculative nodes to flesh out the figure of the woman behind the lens. One of the imperatives of the project, thus, is to delineate the discursive forces, historically and in the contemporary, that have constituted the figure of the woman photographer in India.  

New Insights from Revisiting the Archives

Many of the photography journals, pamphlets, and illustrated magazines published in twentieth-century India are currently housed in institutions across the United States and Europe. Perhaps the most capacious among these is the British Library in London, where Desmond Ray, the deputy keeper of the India Office Library and Records, consolidated in the 1970s and 1980s both images and documents related to photography in India.

The Sylff Research Grant allowed me to explore the British Library collection in great detail during my two-month-long stay in the UK. The other archives and institutions I visited included the Victoria and Albert Museum, the Cambridge South Asia Centre, Birkbeck College, the University of London, and the Courtauld Institute of Art. In each of them, I found librarians, archivists, and professors who provided extraordinary insights into my project, greatly enhancing my understanding of the nebulous photographic landscape in India and in other parts of the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 

 

The Photography and the Book Room of the Photography Centre, Victoria and Albert Museum, September 2024. Photo by the author.

Parsing through different kinds of documents—letters, periodicals, photographs, and news reports—led me to glean names of individuals, organizations, and activities that suggest a scattered but persistent presence of women photographers. They reveal new constituencies of photo practitioners that expand the contours of received histories.

Departing from the recent focus on amateur practices centered on the family, home, and travels, my archival research revealed a discursive emphasis on photography as an occupation for women throughout the twentieth century. Photography emerged as one of the few technology-led activities that could easily make the transition from pastime to profession.

Women photographers thus marked their presence in photo studios, at political rallies, in exhibitions, and behind editorial desks. With cameras in hand, they not only made aesthetic interventions but also exposed the fault lines in the discourse of photography. While much of contemporary scholarship revolves around individual practices, revisiting the archives enabled me to reorient the focus to a matrix of material relations that reveal the history of photography in India as gendered work.

 

From the series Centralia, 2010–2020, by Poulomi Basu, on display at the Photography Centre, Victoria and Albert Museum, October 2024. Photo by the author.

A Global Phenomenon

Besides conducting archival research, I was fortunate to be able to participate in workshops organized by scholars, artists, and critics at the forefront of global photography studies today. A joint initiative by the Victoria and Albert Museum and Birkbeck College for doctoral students called “Researching on, and with, Photographs” proved invaluable in exploring the wide range of contemporary scholarly work on the political and aesthetic purchase of historical photography. A talk on British photographer Jo Spence’s collection was insightful in thinking about feminist articulations of art and activism. It also raised questions about how to preserve and display such works, meant for public engagement, within formal institutional structures.

The sessions held at the V&A Photography Centre also offered glimpses into the early processes in the development of photography, the formation of the institution’s photography collection, and its current decolonial efforts. It gave me the opportunity to discuss the museum’s recently developed women in photography collection, which contains a wide range of photographs made in the British colonies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The workshop and the ongoing projects at the museum foregrounded the renewed interest in the study of women behind the lens. Just in the past five years, there have been major conferences and exhibitions on twentieth-century women photographers in North America, Europe, and Asia. My project gains greater resonance amidst such efforts at rediscovering and reevaluating twentieth-century women’s photography around the world.

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Populism’s Mitigated Potency in Japan and Implications for Mature Democracies

February 25, 2025
By 31407

Despite Japans economic struggles, populism has made limited electoral impact. Jiajia Zhou (Columbia University, 2017) explores how the local organizational strength of incumbent parties mitigates the effectiveness of populist rhetoric and, in doing so, may facilitate the pursuit of electorally challenging policies.

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Populism is an endogenous offshoot of representative democracy. It is a rhetoric that appeals to shared grievances among the electorate, blames representative elites, and in this process “[takes] advantage of democracy’s endogenous discontent with the domineering attitude of the few over the many” (Urbinati 2019, 119).

What is surprising about populism today is not its presence but its potency—that the basic claims of extreme majoritarianism capture the hearts of enough voters to make waves in electoral outcomes. Some scholars have opted to view populism as a strategy employed by political actors to mobilize “large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (Weyland 2001, 14). This aligns with the origin of populism as a concept coined to differentiate electoral politics dominated by charismatic leaders in Latin America from class-based mobilization in European democracies (Roberts 2015, 144).

However, this definition magnifies the present condition while overlooking a key question, that is, why has the anti-elite claim come to amass so much electoral influence in democracies where elections used to be anchored in various loci of organized support? Part of the answer lies in the weakening geographical strength of political parties in mature democracies.

Resisting Populism at the Local Level

Japan serves as a case study to test this theory. Japan, in particular, is a democracy where populism has the potential to succeed. Since the 1990s, Japan’s economy has observed at best tepid growth. More recently, South Korea, whose economy developed later than Japan, has achieved a higher nominal GDP per capita. Not only has Japan’s economic status been shaken, but its weakening yen has also spurred an unfamiliar and trying experience of inflation for its electorate.

Although Japan lacks the presence of an immigrant population large enough to fuel nativist sentiments, democracies with similar ethnic compositions, such as Hungary, show that this alone does not preclude the influence of populism; economic ills can suffice to trigger populist support. Why, then, has populism had a relatively limited impact on elections in Japan?

One factor may be that local, organized support retains its electoral clout. My SRG research identified two sources of evidence for this. First, I revisited an episode of populism in national politics in 2005, when then Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dissolved the lower house of the National Diet and called for an electoral referendum to overturn the upper house’s rejection of his postal privatization bill. The landslide victory demonstrated the potential for populism in Japan, as Koizumi’s anti-elite framing of opposition within his own party—as “forces of resistance” (teiko seiryoku) pursuing “vested interests” (kitokuken)—succeeded in reversing trends in falling voter turnout and secured a two-thirds majority for the LDP and coalition partner Komeito.

Prime Minister Koizumi announcing his party’s election platform calling for the privatization of postal services. ©Junko Kimura / Getty Images

Notably, though, the contests were especially challenging in divided districts where LDP candidates, mostly new blood, were assigned to compete against ex-LDP incumbent candidates who had opposed the postal bill and been stripped of their party’s endorsement.

Even though 51 LDP lower house members resisted Koizumi’s postal bill, only 37 members voted against it, and they were either expelled or ordered to leave the party. The 14 others who abstained or were absent from the vote retained their party affiliation (Shukan Asahi 2005; Asano 2006). Among the 37 who lost their LDP affiliation, 34 ran in the election, and exactly half were reelected.

Analyzing voting patterns across municipalities, I found a negative relationship between the LDP’s organizational strength and its vote gains. Specifically, in areas where the LDP was organizationally stronger, countermobilization by politicians in those districts drew significant votes away from the party. Even though Koizumi’s market-oriented postal privatization policy aimed to benefit urban voters by promoting productive investment, postal opposition candidate Seiko Noda, for example, successfully drew votes away from the LDP, winning reelection in Gifu’s first district covering the prefectural capital of Gifu City.

In another case, Ryozo Ishibashi, an LDP prefectural assembly member in the city of Hiroshima, entered the lower house race to oppose postal privatization and split LDP votes, drawing support away from the party in his district.

By contrast, in districts where the LDP was organizationally weaker and local conservative politicians had for several years been distancing themselves from the LDP, the decisions by these local mobilizers to support postal reform led to large increases in vote share, such as in Shizuoka’s seventh district.

Populism’s Impact on the 2024 Election

Second, I examined populism’s potency in the most recent lower house elections in October 2024 through an online survey experiment involving respondents from all 47 prefectures in Japan. In the survey, respondents were presented with a description referencing recent episodes of the political funds scandal, followed by hypothetical campaign excerpts from a non-LDP conservative candidate.

Respondents were randomly assigned one of two possible campaign messages. The first adopted a populist frame linking current economic woes to the collusive and corrupt LDP politicians who served vested interests over the interests of the people. The second similarly emphasized current economic woes but stressed party turnover and a change of government to strengthen policies as the solution. After reading the message, respondents were asked to indicate their support for the hypothetical candidate.

The experiment yielded evidence for the strong role played by local party representation, that is, the incumbent party’s organizational reach in local areas and role in politically fulfilling local needs.

First, the experiment found higher candidate support when respondents were exposed to populist messaging. This trend was stronger among respondents reporting weaker trust in political institutions, a pattern similar to that of populist support in European countries. However, unlike in Europe, populist support was not particularly strong among respondents residing in areas facing demographic decline or among those reporting economic insecurity in rural areas.

Instead, populist support was stronger among respondents reporting stronger feelings of representation at the municipal level and whose municipal representatives were non-LDP politicians. It was also stronger in prefectures with lower ratios of LDP party membership for each single-member electoral district.

Additional questions examining respondents’ attitudes revealed higher levels of nativist sentiments—where respondents perceive foreigners as a threat to local culture—in municipalities with higher ratios of foreign to local residents. This relationship is distinct from the inflow of tourists, which does not fuel nativist sentiments.

Importance of Local Organizations in Resisting Populist Rhetoric

These results suggest that the lack of populist support in Japan is not the result of unique resistance against the phenomenon but the geographical strength of its incumbent party organization. The idea that political party organization matters is not new to political science research (e.g. Katz and Mair 2018). But the results here reveal how, and in what ways, the incumbent party organization matters against the populist challenge.

My research also shows that the penetration of political party organizations in local electoral districts facilitates countermobilization and increases voter-level resistance against empty populist rhetoric that is devoid of policy relevance. This finding complements studies in other democracies that have identified the important effects of local mobilization but have emphasized the mobilizational effects of populist forces, such as in Sweden (Loxbo 2024).

The local electoral arena remains a salient theater for competition between incumbent and challenger parties. Ideological competition among central parties using party platforms and ideology is not a democratic ill. However, vulnerability to populism grows when attention at the center eviscerates the party of its local organization and overlooks the local arena.

This is not to imply that Japan presents a model of healthy democracy. Rather, it shows that populism, as an anti-elite appeal to majoritarianism, arises from not only commonly cited economic factors but also weak incumbent political party organization.

More broadly, there has been increased scholarly attention to the role of social media, warranted by increased reliance on information received through these platforms. Yet, even if social media has become the primary battleground for the electoral offensive, local areas remain critical flanks where electoral organization and representation matter. Strengthening these local organizational structures is essential if mainstream parties in countries like Japan wish to pursue electorally challenging policies, such as expanding immigration inflows.

References

Asano, Masahiko. 2006. Shimin shakai ni okeru seido kaikaku: Senkyo seido to kohosha rikuruto. Keio University Press.

Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. 2018. Democracy and the Cartelization of Political Parties. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199586011.001.0001.

Loxbo, Karl. 2024. “How the Radical Right Reshapes Public Opinion: The Sweden Democrats’ Local Mobilisation, 2002–2020.” West European Politics 0 (0): 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2024.2396775.

Roberts, Kenneth M. 2015. “Populism, Political Mobilizations, and Crises of Political Representation.” In The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global Perspectives, edited by Carlos de la Torre, 140–58. University Press of Kentucky.

Shukan Asahi. 2005. “Jiminto zohan 51 giin, kaisan de konaru: Koizumi dokatsu hatsugen no daigosan.” August 5.

Urbinati, Nadia. 2019. “Political Theory of Populism.” Annual Review of Political Science 22 (1): 111–27. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070753.

Weyland, Kurt. 2001. “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics.” Comparative Politics 34 (1): 1–22. https://doi.org/10.2307/422412.

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Sylff Research Grant (SRG) Recipients for Fiscal 2024

February 17, 2025

The Sylff Association Secretariat is pleased to announce that 48 fellows have been selected as awardees of the Sylff Research Grant (SRG) for fiscal 2024 (April 2024–March 2025).

The awards were made to support a diverse range of activities during doctoral and early postdoctoral research, including data collection, hiring of research assistants, conducting of domestic and international fieldwork, and outsourcing of tasks requiring specialized knowledge or skills.

We received numerous outstanding applications for research in a wide range of disciplines. Particularly noteworthy were proposals addressing pressing social issues like human rights, access to education, and climate resilience.

For fellows interested in applying for SRG in fiscal 2025, the call for applications will be updated in April. Please note that there will be some changes to the activities eligible for support under the program, so we encourage you to stay informed.

To learn how SRG has supported impactful research in the past, we invite you to explore the Voices from the Sylff Community section that features articles about previous recipients and their projects.

Congratulations to all the awardees! We hope the research conducted through this grant will yield meaningful outcomes for both the fellows and society. The profiles of the 48 awardees and their research topics are available at: List of SRG Awardees FY2024.

You may find their Sylff profiles at: https://www.sylff.org/fellows/?p=SRG

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Invitation to Join the Nippon Foundation Scholars Association (TNFSA)

February 13, 2025

The Sylff Association secretariat is delighted to invite all Sylff fellows to join an interactive platform called The Nippon Foundation Scholars Association (TNFSA) that is administered by the Nippon Foundation--the donor of the Sylff funds.

It is an online community enabling you to connect and network with recipients of various other Nippon Foundation fellowship programs and to support your activities on a long-term basis.

WHO CAN JOIN TNFSA?

All recipients of fellowships provided by the Nippon Foundation Group (including the Tokyo Foundation).

WHAT CAN YOU DO THROUGH TNFSA?

  1. Interact with other fellowship recipients
  • Search out and connect with fellows working in your field or region
  • Find a mentor or apply to be one
  • Create a discussion group and invite other Association members to join
  1. Find opportunities
  • Apply for jobs advertised on the platform (when available) and learn where other TNF scholars are working
  • Participate in events, such as webinars and conferences, that are announced on the platform.
  • Seek support for team projects
  • Promote your own events or achievements
  1. Learn
  • Read news released by Nippon Foundation Group organizations
  • Check posts of other Association members and join the conversation

TNFSA is a platform that all recipients of the approximately 20 Nippon Foundation Group fellowship programs can join. Since Sylff fellows represent the largest bloc of scholars in the Nippon Foundation Scholars Association, we expect that your participation will significantly invigorate this community.

You can use TNFSA to connect not only with other Sylff fellows but also with scholars outside the Sylff community. The fields covered include leadership development, peace studies, Japanese studies, and disability efforts. It is free and an excellent opportunity for you to build your career.

For those interested in joining, please follow these steps:

  1. Visit https://tnfsa.nippon-foundation.or.jp
  1. Click "Request to Join" in the upper right corner
  1. Fill out the form that appears, selecting "Sylff Association" from the menu as your Fellowship Group
  1. Click "Submit Request"
  1. A request will be sent to the administrator, who will confirm that you are a Sylff fellow and approve your application
  1. After confirmation, an email will be sent to the address that you provided. Click the "Activate your Account" button in the email.
  1. You will be taken to a login page. Please log in from this page.
  1. The Live Feed page will open. Please feel free to introduce yourself or just look around and see what is available.

Please contact sylff@tkfd.or.jp if you have trouble accessing the site. For questions regarding the platform’s features, please contact tnfsa@ps.nippon-foundation.or.jp.

We look forward to your participation!

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Announcement: Updates to Sylff Support Programs in 2025

February 12, 2025

Thank you for your interest in our two Support Programs: Sylff Research Grant (SRG) and Sylff Leadership Initiatives (SLI). We are grateful for all the applications and inquiries we received in fiscal year 2024.

This is to notify you of several important changes that will take effect in fiscal 2025 (April 2025–March 2026):

  • Sylff Research Grant: Until now, SRG has been supporting a broad range of research activities, such as hiring assistants and outsourcing large-scale data collection. In 2025, eligible activities will be centered on fieldwork, with awards being expanded to a maximum of $10,000 for international fieldwork to cover travel expenses. Up to $5,000 will be available, as in the past, for domestic fieldwork.

  • Sylff Leadership Initiatives: Due to the need to align the program with our accounting (fiscal) year, applications should now be submitted according to a fixed schedule, rather than any time during the year. We are therefore suspending the acceptance of new applications until the start of fiscal 2025 in April. Prospective applicants should prepare their applications for submission around May 2025. The screening of concept papers and formal applications that have already been submitted will continue. Please wait to hear the screening results from the Sylff Association secretariat.

The Call for Applications for fiscal 2025 for both SRG and SLI will be posted on our website on April 1, 2025. Please be sure to check for updates so you don’t miss any important deadlines!

We appreciate your continued engagement with the Sylff community and look forward to supporting impactful research and leadership initiatives.

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Death and Dying Preferences in China and among Ethnic Chinese US Residents

February 3, 2025
By 30592

A comparative study of end-of-life care preferences among Chinese populations in China and the United States conducted by Yifan Lou (Columbia University, 2019, 2022) reveals shared cultural values influencing end-of-life care decisions, despite differing societal contexts and healthcare systems.

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Death and dying are profound issues that are shaped by cultural, societal, and policy factors. People often assume that the experiences of dying, death outcomes, and end-of-life care decisions—such as opting for hospice care and forgoing treatments—are largely determined by the societal structures and policy frameworks of where individuals live. However, death and dying rituals are deeply cultural, and individuals within the same ethnic groups may share fundamental beliefs and values, even when they are in different environments.[1] The shared cultural perspectives, moreover, can lead to comparable end-of-life care choices and,[2] consequently, similar dying experiences, regardless of societal or policy differences.

I studied Chinese older adults as an entry point to understand how different social contexts and life experiences impact preferences for a “good death” and end-of-life outcomes for individuals with shared cultural roots.

There are approximately 1.5 billion people of Chinese ethnicity living around the world, with about 12% of them aged 65 and older.[3] Ensuring a “good death” for this rapidly growing demographic is becoming an increasingly critical public health priority. However, a key question remains: do Chinese people living in different parts of the world—in Western and Eastern countries—share similar perceptions, wishes, and choices regarding end-of-life care, decision-making, caregiving, and family communication?

 

Working as a social worker in a nursing home four years ago inspired me to conduct this research.

I was privileged to receive a Sylff Research Grant (SRG) that enabled me to explore this topic through a comparative project. I examined the end-of-life care experiences of Chinese individuals in China and the United States—two countries with distinct cultural, social, and healthcare contexts. By investigating these populations, I hoped to shed light on how cultural values, social circumstances, and life experiences (such as immigration versus remaining in the home country) influence older adults’ death and dying experiences. The findings can be critical for policymakers seeking to develop healthcare and palliative care strategies that respect the diverse values, traditions, and preferences of older adults, ensuring their end-of-life experiences align with their cultural beliefs and desires.

With the SRG award, I was able to conduct a series of mixed-method studies examining end-of-life care experiences among Chinese populations in China and the United States. These studies included one qualitative and one quantitative study focused on Chinese individuals in China, as well as a quantitative study of Chinese older adults in the United States. This research yielded findings with which I was able to make two conference presentations with manuscripts in preparation at the Gerontological Society of America’s Annual Scientific Meeting in November 2024 and to draft another manuscript currently under review.

Decisional Conflicts among Family Members

In the first study, I built relationships with community-based healthcare agencies in Shanghai and Beijing providing hospice and palliative care to older adults. I conducted fieldwork alongside these agencies, collecting and analyzing qualitative data on the experiences and perceptions of end-of-life care among older adults, caregivers, and healthcare providers. The study focused on how societal-level factors influence these end-of-life care experiences. Using a multi-level ecological perspective, I sought to shed light on the specific challenges and stressors that family caregivers face when navigating end-of-life care, particularly for individuals living with cognitive impairment.

A hybrid grounded theory approach was used to guide the analysis. Five key themes emerged from the data pointing to multi-level challenges and stressors, framed by social ecological theory. At the individual and interpersonal levels, emotional exhaustion due to decision-making was a prominent theme, especially when caregivers faced communication barriers regarding necessary decision-making paperwork during frequent emergency room visits. Caregivers of individuals with dementia also encountered unique decisional conflicts, often involving disagreements among siblings and uncertainty about the validity of the expressed wishes of those in advanced stages of dementia.

At the mezzo level, a common theme centered around the stigma associated with hospice care for dementia patients, in contrast to the more widely accepted notion of such care for individuals with cancer. Specialized care for dementia symptoms is often viewed as unnecessary or as overtreatment, and the sending of older parents with dementia to hospital-based hospice care—since home-based hospice care is rarely available in China—is considered a violation of filial piety. This stigma often prevents caregivers from seeking appropriate services and support for their dying loved ones. On the macro level, the lack of disease-specific end-of-life resources emerged as a significant challenge. This gap in resources often results in long waiting lists and rising service costs, making it difficult for caregivers to find care that aligns with the specific needs of older adults with different conditions (such as dementia, cancer, and heart failure).

Pain Management in End-of-Life Care

The lack of palliative care and effective pain management is a recurring theme in qualitative studies, and this prompted me to question whether this is a widespread issue for older adults across China. However, generalizing these findings requires nationally representative data. Fortunately, during my fieldwork in Beijing, I connected with a team of interdisciplinary researchers who share similar interests and conducted the first national longitudinal survey of end-of-life care among Chinese older adults.

Through this collaboration, I was able to complete my second study, in which we examined the prevalence of pain and its association with place of death and pain management in the context of urban-rural differences, using data from the China Longitudinal Aging Social Survey. Our sample included 958 decedents aged 60 and above, and we employed logistic regression models for analysis.

Our findings revealed that 26.4% of decedents did not receive timely and effective pain treatment, and 66.5% of families were unable to manage the decedent’s pain. Additionally, 41.96% of decedents experienced severe pain symptoms. Rural residents, those with severe pain, and those who died at home were more likely to forgo adequate pain treatment compared to their urban counterparts. Urban-rural differences emerged where rural older adults with severe pain and those who died at home were less likely to receive timely and effective pain treatment than urban older adults. In urban areas, severe pain symptoms and place of death were significantly associated with receiving appropriate pain management, but this was not the case in rural areas.

This quantitative study supports and extends the qualitative findings, highlighting the urgent need to improve pain management and address disparities in end-of-life care, particularly in rural China.

As noted in the previous qualitative study, many older adults in China do not communicate their wishes for future care to their family members. As a result, family members often face the stressful task of making end-of-life decisions without knowing their loved ones’ preferences and are left uncertain whether any wishes expressed earlier are still valid—particularly if illness has progressed to the point of cognitive impairment.

This raises the question: Are similar gaps in end-of-life care planning present among older, ethnic Chinese adults in the United States, despite the availability of various social policies (such as Medicare benefits for end-of-life care planning) and advocacy programs?

US Trends Mirror Those Seen in China

To address this, I attended networking workshops at gerontology conferences and got connected with a group of researchers who conducted the first population-based study on Chinese immigrants in the United States and have been collecting end-of-life, care-related data since 2021. By working with them, I was able to access this data and start my third study.

We referred to the Population Study of Chinese Elderly in Chicago (also called the PINE Study) to investigate the prevalence and preferences of end-of-life care planning, along with associated sociodemographic and health determinants among older Chinese Americans.

Linear and logistic regressions were conducted to analyze the data. Our findings showed that 46.1% of participants considered end-of-life care planning to be important or somewhat important, yet only 22% had discussed their end-of-life preferences with family members. The most preferred locations for end-of-life care were home (43.7%), hospital (35.5%), and nursing home (10.1%), with only 4.3% preferring hospice care. In terms of decision-making, 47.1% viewed end-of-life care as a family decision, 39.6% saw it as a personal decision, and 7.5% and 3.3% preferred their children or spouses to make decisions on their behalf, respectively.

Our analysis also revealed several factors associated with greater engagement in end-of-life planning, namely, older age, female gender, higher education, greater acculturation, higher levels of religiosity, and more chronic health conditions. These factors were similarly linked to a greater likelihood of having end-of-life care discussions with family members.

Our findings highlighted a low level of engagement in end-of-life care planning among Chinese older adults in the United States, mirroring trends observed in China, despite the availability of more resources and advocacy programs in the United States. This underscores the need for culturally appropriate interventions that respect the diverse preferences for end-of-life care among Chinese older adults in both countries to improve preparedness and decision-making at the end of life.

Next Phase of Research

These SRG-funded pilot studies have laid the groundwork for my next phase of research, which will involve a larger-scale comparative analysis of end-of-life care preferences among Chinese populations in Western and Eastern countries. I am currently compiling the data and developing a plan to conduct a formal statistical population comparison study. This line of research holds significant societal implications for populations worldwide that share similar cultural values and migration histories.

 

End-of-life care for older adults of Chinese ethnicity.

Additionally, these studies underscore the shared cultural foundations among Chinese communities across different social contexts in relation to preferences for end-of-life care and decision-making, despite the unique challenges and needs that arise in each country. This suggests that interventions that have proven effective among Chinese populations in the United States can also be adapted for use in China and raises the possibility of implementing cost-effective interventions across different settings.

This SRG-funded work has broad research implications, as it paves the way for further comparative studies among other ethnic groups to explore whether cultural preferences remain consistent when individuals migrate to or reside in different countries. If such patterns hold true, it could lead to more efficient and scalable interventions tailored to diverse cultural contexts, ultimately improving end-of-life care for various ethnic communities worldwide.

Notes

[1] Megumi Inoue, “The Influence of Sociodemographic and Psychosocial Factors on Advance Care Planning,” Journal of Gerontological Social Work 59, no. 5 (2016): 401–22.

[2] Yifan Lou and Jinyu Liu, “Death Narrative in 19th-Century China: How Did Newspapers Frame Death and Dying,” Omega: Journal of Death and Dying 84, no. 2 (2021): 634–52.

[3] Dudley L Poston Jr and Juyin Helen Wong, “The Chinese Diaspora: The Current Distribution of the Overseas Chinese Population, Chinese Journal of Society 2, no. 3 (2016): 348–73.

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Integrating Technology for Efficient Justice Delivery in South Africa

January 22, 2025
By 28866

Leon Poshai (University of the Western Cape, 2020) examines the challenges and benefits of digitalizing South Africas judicial system. The electronic submission of court documents would enhance efficiency, transparency, and access, but full adoption is being hindered by cybersecurity concerns and limited ICT skills among some users.

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The aim of my SRG study was to analyze the challenges and prospects associated with the implementation of digitalization in South Africa’s justice delivery systems and to propose measures for addressing obstacles to the effective adoption of digital capabilities in the judicial sector. I conducted qualitative, exploratory research targeting participants in the litigation process from whom anecdotal data was collected through semi-structured interviews.

Efficient, transparent, and timely delivery of justice is a pivotal concern for the South African government (Ntengenyane and Masenya 2022). In interviews with study participants, I learned that the government of South Africa has moved swiftly to revamp the justice delivery system by transforming it from analog to digital through the adoption of an online digital case management system called CaseLines (formerly known as Court Online).

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The system was introduced by the Gauteng Local Division of the High Court in January 2020 to enable litigants to file and upload documents electronically during court proceedings. This has ushered in opportunities to digitalize court proceedings and create pathways for expedient and transparent justice delivery in South Africa (Teffo and Chuma 2023).

Minimizing Red Tape

CaseLines is a cloud-based, e-filing system. An interviewed legal practitioner commented that the system offers litigants the opportunity to instantaneously process and submit litigation documents to relevant courts for review. CaseLines was designed to facilitate the filing, storage, and retrieval of court files and, in the process, minimize red tape (Ntengenyane and Masenya 2022).

Study participants indicated that the platform allows registrar clerks and other court officials, as well as court secretaries and administrators, to keep track of cases conveniently and efficiently. An interviewed participant noted that the CaseLines system alerts litigants about scheduled hearings and reviews through emails or short messages. 

CaseLines enables court judges and legal practitioners to document legal evidence and prepare for trials expeditiously. Litigants can prepare for a case online before adjudication, helping to avoid delays in the litigation process.

Interviews with participants revealed that CaseLines has also improved the safety of legal documents, since they are stored in a secure and encrypted database, ensuring that files are not misplaced or lost. They noted that CaseLines offers greater convenience in justice delivery, as it allows applicants and plaintiffs to prepare and upload court case documents without the need for physical visits.

Enabling Remote Adjudication

In many divisions of the High Court in South Africa, particularly in Pretoria and other major cities, CaseLines has led to an overhaul of the case management and legal administration systems. I learned through this study that in cities like Durban, Polokwane, and Cape Town, CaseLines has provided the High Court with the technological tools to refine the internal workflow process, enhancing transparency and accountability in justice delivery. Study participants noted that since the adoption of the CaseLines system, the internal judicial review process has been strengthened, fostering trust among users and resulting in democratized justice accessibility.

Interviewees also noted that CaseLines was particularly important during the COVID-19 pandemic, allowing courts to remotely adjudicate cases despite restrictions on in-person gatherings. When the president declared a state of national disaster in 2020, all divisions of the High Court were directed to use the CaseLines platform, reversing the traditional practice of not allowing electronic documents for litigation purposes and enabling courts to easily manage the inflow of cases (Teffo and Chuma 2023).

South Africa has continued its efforts post pandemic to strengthen the use of technology in its litigation system. Justice delivery in South Africa has become more convenient and flexible for litigants living far away, as court hearings can now be conducted through video conferencing. Nevertheless, the use of online court hearings remains optional, as judges can decide whether a matter should be adjudicated virtually or in person. Thus, hybrid court hearings comprising both physical and virtual attendance are permissible. Generally, virtual hearings are more prevalent in South Africa because of the convenience they offer to litigants.

Addressing Cybersecurity, Digital Literacy Challenges

However, there are many contextual challenges that have derailed the full digitalization of the South African justice delivery system. Firstly, there is fear among some litigants that if they use the CaseLines system, their personal data can be stolen by hackers, given the rise in cybercriminal activities in South Africa and many other parts of the world.

I learned through interviews that not every litigant is comfortable with using CaseLines because of the fear of invasion of personal privacy. Some worried that their data may be tampered with by cybercriminals and that this may result in them losing important evidence for their defense. Thus, there is a need for robust cybersecurity to guard against unauthorized access.

Interviewed participants stated that they would be more inclined to use the system if they are convinced that the information stored on the cloud is safe. The Protection of Personal Information Act (POPI Act or POPIA) is one legislative measure adopted to ensure the protection of personal information from unwarranted access.

Secondly, there is resistance to change by some litigants due to their lack of ICT skills. Some interviewed participants complained that they needed to hire someone to upload their documents, compromising the privacy of the documents and resulting in additional costs. To enable all citizens to make use of digital governance systems like CaseLines, the government of South Africa is making computer literacy training part of the educational curriculum from the elementary to tertiary levels.

Additional challenges include the digital divide, limited internet connectivity in some parts of the country, and general lack of ICT devices. Some participants revealed that they do not own smartphones, which makes it difficult for them to get updates. Substantive investments in ICT infrastructure would thus be needed to ensure that everyone in the country has universal access to ICT resources and internet connectivity, as well as to the greater convenience, transparency, efficiency, and flexibility promised by the digitalization of the South African justice delivery process.

 

References

Teffo, Dikeledi and Kabelo Given Chuma. 2023. “Management of Electronic Records to Support Judicial Systems at Temba Magistrates’ Court in the North West Province of South Africa.” Journal of the South African Society of Archivists 56: 35–54.

Ntengenyane, Khunjulwa, and Tlou Maggie Masenya. 2022. “The Management of Digital Court Records for Justice Delivery in the South African High Courts.” Mousaion 40 (3): 1–17.

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Thessaloniki: Exploring the History and Society of an Ancient City in Macedonia

January 16, 2025
By 27750

Thessaloniki, a historical city with deep Hellenistic and Roman roots, offers a unique lens into ancient Macedonian society. Georgios Athanasiadis (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2019) used an SRG award to conduct an extensive prosopographical analysis of the city’s inhabitants by studying the inscriptions held by various archaeological museums.

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Thessaloniki is a Greek city in central Macedonia founded in 316–15 BC by Kassandros, one of the diadochi (generals) of Alexander the Great. In the Hellenistic period, it was an important center of the Antigonid kingdom, and later, in Roman times, it was selected as the capital of the province of Macedonia and became a free city (civitas libera) (Haensch 1997).

The epigraphic harvest of the city yields around 1,600 inscriptions mentioning more than 3,000 persons. The aim of my doctoral research is to create a prosopography of the city and a thorough study of its society, focusing on the period from its foundation until its selection by Galerius as his seat of government in AD 299. The prosopographical catalogue will provide a full list of Thessalonicans, with each entry being accompanied by a bibliography and a short commentary on the person’s life based on the primary sources.

Evidence for each person, including name category, legal status, occupation, and relationships, is being recorded on a specifically designed online database and will be used in the second part of my thesis to describe the structure of and the changes in the local society of the period under examination.

Need for an Updated Prosopography

The selection of this topic was made for two main reasons. The first was my interest in the history and epigraphy of Macedonia, a peripheral area of the ancient Greek world that has been more systematically studied in the last three decades. The city of Thessaloniki, in particular, is of special importance as a new royal city of the Hellenistic period, evolving after the Roman conquest into a major center of the Roman province of Macedonia. The status of the city as capital, its port, and the Roman-built Via Egnatia road connecting the Adriatic to the Aegean contributed to its multiethnic population, consisting of citizens of other Macedonian cities, people from the Greek East, Romans, Jews, and Christians (Allamani-Souri 2003; Adam-Veleni 2011). These features made the local society an interesting case study worth investigating.

Autopsy of an inscription at the Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki (study of the text and the letter form).

The second reason for my interest was that a prosopography of Thessaloniki is missing, and scholars can only draw on an out-of-date Macedonian prosopography that was published in 1955 and supplemented in 1967. Recent excavations have significantly increased the number of inscriptions from Thessaloniki, though, and the publication of a supplement to the initial corpus makes a study like mine not only possible but also necessary. Works by other scholars have enriched our knowledge of various aspects of ancient Thessaloniki, such as its private associations (Nigdelis 2006, 2010) and elite families (Nigdelis 1996; Bartels 2008). However, a systematic study of the local society is a desideratum in scholarship (Zoumbaki 2009, 809–10), since several questions remain unanswered, and some issues require reexamination.

In the first two years of my research, I gathered relevant source materials and have almost completed the compilation of the prosopographical catalogue. This entailed studying 1,000 inscriptions from Thessaloniki and other areas where Thessalonicans are known to have lived (such as Thebes, Delos, Samothrace, and Smyrna). Most of these inscriptions have already been published, mainly in the two corpora dedicated to Thessaloniki (Edson 1972; Nigdelis 2017), but I have also studied a small number of unpublished inscriptions that are mentioned without transcription in archaeological reports. Apart from inscriptions, literary sources and papyri were also used, both as testimonies for Thessalonicans and as sources for the history of the city in the Hellenistic and Roman periods.

In the case of inscriptions, the transcriptions of all names were checked through photos and squeezes (in the archives of the Institute of Historical Research/NHRF) or autopsies of the monuments. The SRG award was crucial for this purpose, since it financed five epigraphic missions to Thessaloniki, Beroia, Thebes, and Chalcis, during which I studied inscriptions kept in the archaeological museum of each city. I also had the opportunity to study documents in the Historical Archive of the Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki, which offered valuable information on the discovery and the provenance of many inscribed monuments.

Shedding New Light on Thessalonican Society

My research has so far yielded several interesting findings that have shed light on the society of Roman Thessaloniki, some of which I have presented in postgraduate conferences and articles. The reexamination of the inscriptions and the autopsies have led to new readings of names, which were either misread by or not visible to former researchers. Some inscriptions have also been redated based on epigraphic (e.g., letter form) and archaeological or prosopographical (e.g., identification of the same person or relatives in different inscriptions) evidence.

Making a squeeze of an inscription at the Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki.

In addition to this, the reconsideration of former identifications has shown that some of them have been inaccurate. For example, a prominent benefactress from Thessaloniki had been identified with a poetess attested in Thespies mainly because they bore the same—rather popular—name. A reappraisal of the available evidence has shown, however, that the two women lived two centuries apart. The identification proposed must thus be abandoned.

Finally, similar observations have required the reconstruction of the stemma (genealogy) of some Thessalonican families so that the correct relationships are depicted. In the next two years, following the completion of the prosopographical catalogue, I plan to analyze and interpret the data, using statistical methods where appropriate, to determine patterns and describe features of Thessalonican society. It is hoped that my thesis will cover a gap in the literature on ancient Thessaloniki and will serve as a reference work for scholars studying the history of the city and ancient Macedonia in general.

I would like to extend my thanks to the Ephorates of Antiquities and especially the Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki for the permission to study inscriptions from their collections as well as their assistance throughout my research.

References

Adam-Veleni, P. 2011. “Thessalonike.” In R. J. Lane Fox (ed.) Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC–300 AD, 545–62. Brill.

Allamani-Souri, V. 2003. “Ιστορικό διάγραμμα της αυτοκρατορικής Θεσσαλονίκης από επιγραφικές και αρχαιολογικές μαρτυρίες.” In Δ. Β. Γραμμένος (ed.) Ρωμαϊκή Θεσσαλονίκη, 80–91. Αρχαιολογικό Μουσείο Θεσσαλονίκης.

Bartels, J. 2008. Städtische Eliten im römischen Makedonien. De Gruyter.

Edson, C. 1972. Inscriptiones Graecae, X. Inscriptiones Epiri, Macedoniae, Thraciae, Scythiae. Pars II: Inscriptiones Macedoniae. Fasc. 1: Inscriptiones Thessalonicae et viciniae. De Gruyter.

Haensch, R. 1997. Capita provinciarum: Statthaltersitze und Provinzialverwaltung in der römischen Kaiserzeit. Zabern.

Kanatsoulis, D. 1955. Μακεδονική προσωπογραφία (από του 148 π. χ. μέχρι των χρόνων του Μ. Κωνσταντίνου) (Ελληνικά, Παράρτημα 8). Εταιρεία Μακεδονικών Σπουδών.

Kanatsoulis, D. 1967. Μακεδονική προσωπογραφία (από του 148 π. χ. μέχρι των χρόνων του Μ. Κωνσταντίνου) Συμπλήρωμα. Εταιρεία Μακεδονικών Σπουδών.

Nigdelis, P. 1996. “Geminii und Claudii: Die Geschichte zweier führender Familien von Thessaloniki in der späteren Kaiserzeit. ” In A. D. Rizakis (ed.) Roman Onomastics in the Greek East: Social and Political Aspects. Proceedings of the International Colloquium organized by the Finnish Institute and the Centre for Greek and Roman Antiquity, Athens 7–9 September 1993, 129–41. Κέντρον Ελληνικής και Ρωμαϊκής Αρχαιότητος/Εθνικόν Ίδρυμα Ερευνών.

Nigdelis, P. M. 2006. Επιγραφικά Θεσσαλονίκεια. Συμβολή στην Πολιτική και Κοινωνική Ιστορία της Αρχαίας Θεσσαλονίκης 1. University Studio Press.

Nigdelis, P. M. 2010. “Voluntary Associations in Roman Thessalonike: In Search of Identity and Support in a Cosmopolitan Society.” In L. Nasrallah, C. Bakirtzis, and S. J. Friesen (eds.) From Roman to Early Christian Thessalonike: Studies in Religion and Archaeology, 13–47. Harvard University Press.

Nigdelis, P. M. 2017. Inscriptiones Graecae, X. Inscriptiones Epiri, Macedoniae, Thraciae, Scythiae. Pars II: Inscriptiones Macedoniae. Fasc. 1: Inscriptiones Thessalonicae et viciniae. Supplementum primum: Tituli inter a. MCMLX et MMXV reperti. De Gruyter.

Zoumbaki, S. 2009. Review of Π. Μ. Νίγδελης,Επιγϱαφιϰά Θεσσαλονίϰεια. Συμβολ στν πολιτιϰὴ ϰαι ϰοινωνιϰὴ ιστοϱία τς ὰϱχαίας Θεσσαλονίϰης. Latomus 68(3), 808–10.

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Rightly Guided Leaders: The Role of Religion in the Political Ideology of Viktor Orbán and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

January 8, 2025
By 29256

Viktor Orbán and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have strategically used religion to shape their political ideologies and establish unchallenged power in Hungary and Turkey. Tamas Dudlak (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2021) introduces his groundbreaking comparative study on how their religious discourses reflect and influence their political systems.

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As part of my SRG 2023 research project, I compared the role of religion in the political ideology of contemporary Hungary and Turkey. Over the last decade, there has been a growing interest in illiberal governance systems, primarily concerning Hungary and Turkey (Bremmer 2018; Economist 2018). Beyond superficial comparisons of these illiberal states, however, the similarities and differences between the lengthy political careers of Viktor Orbán and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and their respective ideologies have not gained much academic attention.

Recently, both Orbán and Erdoğan have utilized the same power techniques to maintain their unchallenged leading position in their respective countries: their strategy can be characterized by changes to the electoral system, excessive media control, defamatory campaigns against political competitors (Jobbik and HDP parties, respectively), aggrandizement of internal-external enemies (Soros-Brussels and Gülen-Washington, respectively), and emphasis on identity politics (nationalism and religious mobilization).

The careers of the two leaders represent the main patterns of political evolution in Hungary and Turkey after the Cold War. Both Orbán and Erdoğan followed global political ideologies (liberalism and nationalism, though in different forms) and utilized them in different periods of their careers. And then, around the economic crisis in 2008, they shifted their political focus to populism, nationalist ideals, and religiosity (Christianity and Islam, respectively), thereby challenging the foundations of the liberal and secular democratic systems in their respective countries.

While attempts have been made in the literature to define the religious foundations of the two systems (institutions, movements, parties, and belief systems), the religious discourse of Orbán and Erdoğan has not been addressed in depth and comparatively. Despite the growing literature on populism, illiberalism, and authoritarian tendencies in the “Western periphery,” there is a lack of context-sensitive analysis of the religious ideas expressed by Orbán and Erdoğan.

The Shaping of the Religious Narrative

To fill this gap, I conducted research to compare the circumstances that shaped the religious narrative of the two leaders. The goal was to acquire an empirical understanding of how religious discourses have been formulated by politicians in Hungary and Turkey over the last decade and a half and what underlying factors (historical and geopolitical) and current circumstances (legislative background and the domestic and foreign political environment) shape the outcome of governmental decisions (political practice) and discourses (political theory).

By explaining the differences and similarities, I hope to shed light on the essential characteristics of these systems and to arrive at a better understanding of the evolution of the religious discourses utilized.

St. Stephen’s Basilica, completed in 1906, is the largest church in Budapest.

I focused on the Hungarian and Turkish governmental “mainstream” religious discourse after 2010 to determine how the leaders of these political systems thematize Christianity and Islam in their political agenda (identity, national goals, moral values, and humanitarianism). The empirical part of the research examined how the two leaders, Viktor Orbán and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, perceived the role of religion in their formative years and how religion later came to inform their political views.

As a matter of general or theoretical inquiry, I compared how illiberal governments conduct their religious discourses. Are Turkey and Hungary going in the same direction in their respective religious policies, for example, utilizing religion for counter-Europeanization or anti-Westernism and supporting a distinctive civilizational identity?

The underlying narratives were examined by discourse and content analysis. For this purpose, I focused on the official statements and speeches of Orbán and Erdoğan. The central position of the leaders can be explained by their dominant role in constituting the current political systems in Hungary and Turkey. In countries where populist politics thrive, the charismatic leader gains greater importance in the political arena.

Similar Patterns

Commonalities between the careers of Viktor Orbán and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are evident. Both grew up in the peripheries (countryside) of secular political systems with nondemocratic characteristics (socialism and Kemalism, respectively), yet religiosity played an essential role in their early lives. Later, their success was related to their ability to mobilize critical voices against these secular regimes; consequently, they were elected as reformists and became advocates of liberal democracy during their early political life (in the 1990s and 2000s).

Around the economic crisis in 2008, though, they gradually shifted their political focus to populism, nationalist ideals, and religiosity (Christianity and Islam, respectively), thereby challenging the foundations of the liberal and secular democratic system. Instead of following the path for which they had previously advocated, both leaders launched a rhetorical campaign against the West and its institutions and, at the same time, started to give greater attention to the East and South in their foreign and identity policies.

Two paradigm shifts can be identified in the political careers of Orbán and Erdoğan. These brought a new set of views and political theory to political practice. To put it differently, both leaders reorganized and rephrased the basis of their political legitimacy many times, using similar patterns, as follows:

Erdoğan

Orbán

Shifted first from an Islamist politician to a moderate Islamist (with liberal elements) and then transformed into a Muslim nationalist (with authoritarian elements).

Was a petty bourgeois with a conservative background (prior to embarking on political career), embracing liberal thinking as a university student and initially as a politician. After becoming well-established, he drove his party to conservativism and religiousness and bracketed the issue of democracy in practice (illiberalism).


Orbán’s party, Fidesz (originally Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, or Alliance of Young Democrats), came to power in 2010 with a firm policy against the liberal elite, having earlier led a coalition government between 1998 and 2002. Once in power, Orbán continued the fight against external and internal elites. After weakening the domestic liberal elite, Orbán’s political struggle has increasingly transformed into a campaign against the influence of foreigners. The most striking example is his ongoing confrontation with the EU and the so-called “values of the Western elites.”

A similar pattern can be observed in the case of Erdoğan. Even though Erdoğan’s party, the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or Justice and Development Party), has been in power since 2002, he increasingly emphasized the unifying nature and cultural importance of the Turkish identity and Islam to a Turkish public disillusioned with the EU accession process. Although initially popular with Western leaders, Erdoğan’s rhetoric toward Turkey’s Western allies slowly gave way to criticism as Turkish democracy failed to consolidate, and authoritarian tendencies in Turkey deepened. And as Erdoğan fell out of grace, he increasingly interlinked the domestic opposition to certain external forces of the West that allegedly tried to overthrow him as Turkey’s “legitimate leader.” This anti-liberal and anti-Western narrative created a revanchist style of populism based on the dichotomic worldview that Western civilization and Islam are incompatible (Kaya et al. 2019, 7–8).

Geopolitical Liminality

Beyond the direction of political development, the geopolitical status of Hungary and Turkey also has some similarities. Geopolitical liminality is the main characteristic of the two, even if Hungary became an “insider” as an EU member while Turkey remained a relative “outsider” of the European project and the continent itself (ww and Kutlay 2017, 1). Therefore, it might be more precise to say that while Hungary is on the periphery of the West, Turkey is on the periphery of Europe. Turkey is on the periphery of the Middle East and the Islamic civilization, while Hungary is on the southeastern flank of Western Christianity (Roman Catholicism, Calvinism, and Lutheranism), surrounded by the “Orthodox civilization.”

The Hagia Sophia in Istanbul was originally built as a church, then converted to a mosque before serving as a museum between 1935 and the summer of 2020. Since then, it has been reconverted to a mosque.

This in-betweenness makes these cases interesting from a religious point of view, since the geopolitical positions of Turkey and Hungary postulate highly contested and confrontational identity formations.

Despite the commonalities between the two leaders and their respective political systems, the crucial question is why and how Orbán and Erdoğan sometimes departed on a different path. In the light of global political tendencies, the interesting puzzle lies in how the two leaders define the nature and aims of their respective political systems through the language of religion.

My research, I believe, can contribute to the literature in two ways. The comparative work is the first of its kind and can thus shed light on the essential characteristics of these political systems and better identify the main themes of the respective religious discourses. The findings can also open a new area of research, leading to a fuller understanding and theorization of how illiberal governments design their religious discourses and build policies around certain religious ideals.

 

References

Bremmer, Ian. 2018. “The ‘Strongmen Era’ Is Here. Here’s What It Means for You.” Time, May 3. https://time.com/5264170/the-strongmen-era-is-here-heres-what-it-means-for-you/.

Economist. 2018. “How Democracy Dies. Lessons from the Rise of Strongmen in Weak States,” June 16. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/06/16/lessons-from-the-rise-of-strongmen-in-weak-states.

Kaya, Ayhan, Max-Valentin Robert, and Ayşe Tecmen. 2019. “Populism in Turkey and France: Nativism, Multiculturalism and Euroskepticism.” Turkish Studies 21 (3).

Öniş, Ziya, and Mustafa Kutlay. 2017. “Global Shifts and the Limits of the EU’s Transformative Power in the European Periphery: Comparative Perspectives from Hungary and Turkey.” Government and Opposition 54 (2).

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100th Anniversary of Rhapsody in Blue: Juilliard Dean, Fellow Interviewed by NYC Local Media

December 24, 2024

George Gershwin’s Rhapsody in Blue, composed in 1924, celebrated its 100th anniversary this year. As a masterpiece that fuses classical music with jazz, it has been featured in many films, concerts, and even at the Olympic Games.

The piece has also become an iconic symbol of New York City and was recently showcased on local news channel Pix11. Interviewed in the story were David Ludwig, SSC chair and dean and director of the Music Division at the Juilliard School, and 2024 Sylff fellow Anoush Pogossian, who spoke about the composition’s opening clarinet solo.

Pogossian performed the piece with the Juilliard Orchestra at a concert on November 18 at Alice Tully Hall in New York’s Lincoln Center. The Juilliard Orchestra is the university’s largest and most visible student performing ensemble comprising nearly 400 students in the bachelor’s and master’s degree programs.

The concert, performed before a thrilled audience as well as being streamed live, also featured Alan Hovhaness’s Symphony No. 2, “Mysterious Mountain”; Joan Tower’s Chamber Dance; and Samuel Barber’s Symphony No. 1.

Another 2024 Sylff fellow, flutist Phoebe Rawn, performed with Julliard’s AXIOM at a concert on November 25, also at Alice Tully Hall. AXIOM is dedicated to performing the masterworks of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century repertoire. She was featured in Charles Ives’s Central Park in the Dark and Augusta Read Thomas’s Solstice Ritual (Homage to Varèse and Ravel) for 14 Virtuosi.

Many of Juilliard’s performances throughout the year can be viewed free of charge, both online and in person, and the school invites those interested to check its Performance Calendar to enjoy the rich musical experiences Juilliard offers.